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THE PARADOX OF PROFESSIONALISM: JOURNALISM AND
MALPRACTICE
Robert E. Drechsel"
For 125 years, if not longer, many journalists and other media
practitioners have either aspired to or claimed professional status. With
its educational trappings, articulation of ethics, standards of good
practice, and commitment to public service ideals, professionalism has
been seen as essential for quality, legitimacy, credibility, and respect.
The aspirations of media practitioners have been no different than those
of workers in any other fields.
The media may only now be beginning to understand that costs
accompany the benefits of professional status. Professionalism creates
expectations not only among an occupation's practitioners, but among
those it serves. Expectations and standards of good practice beget their
obverse--concepts of malpractice. The media are learning that a broad
range of communication problems can be understood as malpractice.
This essay ponders the linkage between professionalism and
malpractice in the context of occupations generally and in the context
ofjournalism specifically. It raises the question of whether pressure for
increased legal liability is, ironically, one of the inevitable by-products
of professionalization despite the fact that professionalization aims to
give occupations greater autonomy.
In fact, professionalism seems inherently to become deeply
entangled in regulation, albeit regulation based on standards that may be
drawn largely from within the professions themselves. Professions or
professionalizing occupations themselves often seem to be of two
minds, simultaneously wanting substantial autonomy and yet seeking
special protection or privileges backed by government power. There-
fore, this essay attempts to put "communication malpractice" in the
larger context of malpractice across occupations, and asks ultimately
whether the First Amendment may not have blinded the media to the
reality that what is happening to them is little different from what has
happened to many other professions or quasi-professions.
To develop this idea, I draw first on the literature from the
sociology of professions to lay out the meaning of profession and
professionalization. I illustrate these concepts with examples from two
fields, medicine and accountancy, and briefly describe the development
of malpractice liability in those fields. Finally, I turn my attention to the
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development of professional aspirations in Americanjournalism, noting
how it has paralleled developments in other occupations, and concluding
that concomitant pressure for expansion of liability for journalistic
malpractice should come as no surprise.
For my purposes, it matters less whether journalism and other
media occupations technically meet sociological or legal definitions of
"professions" than whether media occupations can be seen as
"professionalizing." Nor should First Amendment considerations be
seen as rendering moot any attempt to categorize media occupations as
professional (e.g., arguments that because licensing is impossible, so is
professional status). The First Amendment, after all, has been largely
ignored in the context of malpractice regarding non-media occupations,
even when communication is clearly involved. Additionally, it is
dangerously easy for journalists to convince themselves that the First
Amendment will or should shield them from liability for malpractice
while simultaneously embracing professionalism. Indeed, the faltering
public credibility of the media may be another manifestation of the
impact of professional expectations going unfulfilled.
Ultimately, this essay concludes that the relationship between law
and media professionalism is not what one might intuitively expect.
Embracing the accouterments of professionalism-including commit-
ment to high standards of practice, ethical behavior and public
service-may invite as much legal entanglement as it avoids. Media
practitioners need to come to grips with this paradox as other occupa-
tions have. While the First Amendment will continue to be a buffer for
media workers, they ought not be surprised at pressure from their
"clients" and constituents that will constantly test and occasionally
overcome that buffer.
I. PROFESSIONALISM AND PROFESSIONALIZATION
Many occupations have aspired to professional status, and
sociologists have long pondered the meaning of "professional" or
"professionalism" and the process of professionalization. Professional-
ism can be seen as the ideology and associated activities in an occupa-
tional group whose members aspire to professional status, even though
actual professional status may never be achieved.' But professional and
other kinds of occupational behavior differ only relatively with respect
1. See Howard M. Vollmer & Donald L. Mills, Editors' Introduction to
PROFESSIONALIZATION at viii (Howard M. Vollmer & Donald L. Mills eds., 1996).
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to certain attributes common to all occupational behavior Profession-
alism is a matter of degree, varying in terms of such attributes as degree
of generalized and systematic knowledge; orientation to community
interest rather than self-interest; degree of self-control through internal-
ized codes of ethics and voluntary associations controlled by work
specialists themselves; and degree to which a system of monetary and
honorary rewards primarily symbolizes work achievement and not
individual self-interest.3
Etzioni has triedto distinguish "professional" behavior on the basis
that it is ultimately motivated by what the professional believes is right
as opposed to what is approved by someone of superior rank." Eliot
Freidson sees educational requirements as a primary factor in defining
a profession.5 Others suggest additional criteria, such as an occupation's
use of systematic theory, its authority, the existence of ethical codes, a
distinct professional culture, a strong intellectual component to the
work, the use of educationally communicable technique, tendency
toward self-organization and altruistic motivation.6
Whatever the criteria for professional status, the process of
achieving it is itself worthy of examination. Sociologist Harold
Wilensky's classic description remains influential:
[T]here is a typical process by which the established
professions have arrived: men begin doing the work full
time and stake out a jurisdiction; the early masters of the
technique or adherents of the movement become concerned
about standards of training and practice and set up a
training school, which, if not lodged in universities at the
outset, makes academic connection within two or three
decades; the teachers and activists then achieve success in
promoting more effective organization, first local, then
national-through either the transformation of an existing
2. See Bernard Barber, Some Problems in the Sociology of Professions, in THE
PROFESSIONS IN AMERICA 17 (Kenneth S. Lynn ed., 1965).
3. See id. at 18. For another scaling approach, see WILBERT E. MOORE, THE
PROFESSIONS: ROLES AND RULES 5-6 (1970).
4. See AMITAI ETZIONI, Editor's Preface to THE SEMI-PROFESSIONS AND THEIR
ORGANIZATION at x-xi ( Amitai Etzioni ed., 1969).
5. See ELIOT FREIDSON, PROFESSIONAL POWERS: A STUDY OF THE
INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF FORMAL KNOWLEDGE 59 (1986).
6. See, e.g., ABRAHAM FLEXNER, IS SOCIAL WORK A PROFESSION? (1915); William J.
Goode, The Theoretical Limits of Professionalization, in ETZIONI, supra note 4, at 277;
Ernest Greenwood, Attributes of a Profession, in PROFESSIONALIZATION 10 (Howard M.
Vollmer & Donald L. Mills eds., 1996); Talcott Parsons, Professions, in 12 INT'L
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOC. SCI. 536 (David L. Sills ed., 1968).
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occupational association or the creation of a new one.
Toward the end, legal protection of the monopoly of skill
appears; at the end, a formal code of ethics is adopted.7
Wilensky's characterization has been thoughtfully criticized, but the
idea that professionalization is a process-sometimes successful and
sometimes not-subject to study has been widely accepted.8
A. Two Examples: Medicine and Accountancy
One can see the concepts of professionalism and professionalization
at work in the context of many occupations. For example, both
medicine and accountancy have gone through a professionalization
process in the United States. Medicine, of course, has long been
regarded as a profession, but accountancy offers an interesting and
useful example of how occupations can aspire to professional status and
make substantial progress over a relatively short period of time.
Accountancy is also interesting because its research and auditing
functions parallel the investigative and watchdog roles of the press.
Medicine, some have argued, had fundamental professional
attributes as early as medieval times,9 and was subject to legal regulation
as early as the thirteenth century.10 But in the United States, the road to
broadly recognized professional status for medicine was rocky for much
of the first century of the republic. Anyone could offer what purported
to be medical treatment, schools were shoddy, and medical societies
were scattered and unable to exercise strong, uniform control. Although
some licensing existed during the early years, the Jacksonian era and its
anti-intellectualism swept away nearly all state medical licensing in the
1830s and 1840s, and it would be decades before meaningful licensing
became re-established."1
As early as 1808, a medical society in Boston adopted a code of
ethical behavior, with societies in several other cities following suit. 2
Reflecting "mainstream" practitioners' efforts to establish standards and
7. Harold Wilensky, The Professionalization of Everyone?, 70 AM. J. SOC. 137, 145-
46 (1964).
8. See, e.g., Goode, supra note 6, at 275-76. See also Barber, supra note 2, at 23-24.
9. See VERN L. BULLOUGH, THE DEVELOPMENT OF MEDICINE AS A PROFESSION 108
(1966).
10. See Thomas Percival, The Moral Regulation of Physicians by Civil Authority, in
PERCIVAL'S MEDICAL ETHIcs 14 (Chauncey D. Leake ed., 1927).
11. See DONALD E. KONOLD, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN MEDICAL ETHICS 7 (1962).
12. See id. at 2.
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control both qualifications and entry into the occupation (not to mention
to de-legitimize and drive out practitioners of alternative medicine), the
American Medical Association ("AMA") was founded in 1847. It
immediately adopted a code of ethics that represented a response to
Jacksonian attacks and an effort to regain patient confidence. 3 By the
mid-1850s many local societies formed and adopted the AMA Code.' 4
Medical education was strengthened substantially in the last quarter of
the nineteenth century, and significant advances were made in medical
techniques. Licensing was re-established, and standards became more
uniform.
By the early twentieth century, the AMA turned directly to state
legislation, not ethics, to attack practices by those it regarded as
quacks.'5 In fact, in 1903, the AMA abandoned any enforcement of
ethics and declared that its new "Principles of Medical Ethics" was
simply an advisory document.'6 By then, however, the AMA had
achieved true national unity and control over the medical profession
from the local level up. 7 American doctors had achieved the primary
trappings of professional status: specialized education, intellectual and
technical expertise, self-organization, a public service orientation, an
ethics code, and substantial control of their field and entry into it.
Accountancy offers a more recent example. Indeed, until 1896,
there were no certified public accountants in the United States. The rise
of public accountancy paralleled the development of publicly owned
corporations and the concomitant need by investors for independent,
objective financial information. The American Association of Public
Accountants was formed in 1887 with only thirty-one members, but
further growth in the occupation was stimulated by such developments
as the new income tax and the creation of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion, the Interstate Commerce Commission, and the Federal Reserve
Board.'8 In 1896, New York became the first state to provide statutorily
for exclusive certificates for CPAs upon successful examination. 9 The
Journal of Accountancy began publication in 1905,2" and already in the
13. See id. at 1.
14. See id. at 12.
15. See id. at 31-32.
16. See id. at 69.
17. See ROSEMARY STEvENS, AMERICAN MEDICINE AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 29
(1971).
18. See JOHN L. CAREY, THE RISE OF THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION: FROM TECHNICIAN
TO PROFESSIONAL 2, 6-7 (1969).
19. See id. at 44.
20. See id. at 52.
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1920s, at least some accountants were acknowledging that they had
obligations to the public as well as to their clients."' College instruction
in accounting was instituted and by 1916, accounting "academics"
formed an organization of their own.22 About the same time, the
Association of American Accountants was restructured into the
American Institute of Accountants, in part so it would have the power
to make and enforce ethics rules.23 Additionally, after being assigned a
share of the blame for the economic collapse of the 1930s, accountants
embraced ethical standards in hopes of avoiding stronger government
regulation. 4 By 1960, a standard, national CPA exam had been
established.2"
Standards developed within the occupation itself came to be known
as generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP") and, ultimately,
generally accepted auditing standards ("GAAS"). These standards
covered the presentation of financial data and procedures for verifying
its accuracy and completeness. In 1936 the now dominant American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants ("AICPA") was formed.26 Like
doctors, accountants had traveled a path that included development of
a strong organization, certification standards, higher education require-
ments, and ethical principles.
B. Malpractice and Professional Standards: Medicine and Accoun-
tancy
1. The Rise of Malpractice Actions in Medicine
Malpractice actions against physicians in the United States were
rare until the 1840s, when they suddenly exploded. Historians attribute
the explosion to such seemingly contradictory factors as the strong anti-
professional sentiment during the Jacksonian period, which made those
physicians who hoped to improve medicine via licensing appear to be
acting against the public interest; the frequently bad performance of
poorly-trained physicians; intra-professional rivalry which led physi-
21. See id. at 252-53.
22. See id at 261.
23. See id. at 228.
24. See CAREY, supra note 18, at 247.
25. See JAMES DON EDWARDS, HISTORY OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTING IN THE UNITED STATES
306 (1960).
26. See DAN L. GOLDWASSER& M. THOMAS ARNOLD, ACCOuNTANTS' LtLtBrY 1-2 to
1-4(1996).
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cians to denigrate each other's practices; and dramatic technological
advances which inflated expectations in both physicians and patients."
Ironically, the best educated and most successful physicians were
most likely to be sued. They were victims of the rising expectations that
accompanied the new, advanced procedures they used, and they were
more likely to be aggressive in attempting these new procedures. Now
the very textbooks and advanced manuals they produced could be used
in court against them as standards from which they could be accused of
deviating.28
Improvements in medical education, the re-institution of licensing,
and the strengthening of the AMA did not reduce malpractice litigation.
Although some antipathy toward physicians eased, medical technology
continued to advance and raise expectations. Americans became more
materialistic and even more concerned with physical well-being while
lawyers' use of contingency fees expanded access to legal services.29
2. The Rise of Malpractice Actions in Accountancy
Meanwhile, the first malpractice cases against accountants began
to appear in the twentieth century precisely as their professionalization
picked up steam, with most cases involving complaints about some
aspect of the auditing function.3" The legal standard of conduct
expected of accountants came to be the standards established by the
occupation itself, and these included both standards of practice and
ethical standards set forth in the codes of professional conduct of the
American Institute and state societies." 1 Liability today is no longer
limited to those with whom accountants have contractual relations, but
has been widely recognized as extending to third parties who rely on
accountants' representations-to all persons an accountant reasonably
should foresee might obtain and rely on her reports.32
27. See KENNETH A. DEVILLE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY
AMERICA: ORIGINS AND LEGACY 224-26 (1990).
28. See JAMES C. MOHR, DOCTORS AND THE LAW: MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE IN
NtNETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 113-15 (1993).
29. See DEVILLE, supra note 27, at 227-29.
30. See WARREN FREEDMAN, MALPRACTICE LIABILITY IN THE BUSINESS PROFESSIONS 20
(1995).
31. See GOLDWASSER & ARNOLD, supra note 26, at 2-3.
32.. See Gary Lawson & Tamara Mattison, A Tale ofTwo Professions: The Third-Party
Liability of Accountants and Attorneys for Negligent Misrepresentation, 52 OHIO ST. L.J.
1309, 1332 (1991).
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Both medicine and accountancy thus illustrate Wilensky's
professionalization paradigm. In both disciplines workers became
concerned about standards of training and practice. We see training
established at the university level. We see organizations formed to
further occupational interests, adoption of formal ethics codes, and,
ultimately, government protection of the monopoly of skill. And
eventually we see alleged breaches of the standards set by the occupa-
tions themselves become the basis for allegations of malpractice. As
professional standards rose and competence increased, so did legal
pressure. As the occupations looked to government for recognition and
protection of special status and to their own practitioners and organiza-
tions.to develop and enforce uniform standards, they simultaneously
gained and sacrificed autonomy. Some accountants, for example, did
this quite self-consciously. In 1912, the Journal of Accountancy
suggested that it would be desirable for accountants to be held legally
responsible for losses sustained by investors where an accountant failed
to use reasonable care.33
II. PROFESSIONALIZATION ANDJOURNALISM
Professionalization and journalism have been linked in the United
States since at least the late 1860s when General Robert E. Lee
established a journalism program at Washington College.34 The first
textbook forjournalists was published in 1872 and explicitly called the
occupation a profession.35 The president of Cornell University urged
establishment of a journalism program there in the mid-I 870s, again
under the rubric of professional education, although the plan never came
to fruition.36 As early as 1875, a brochure reporting the results of a
survey by a New York newspaperman of some twenty-seven prominent
journalists frequently used the word "professional" in regard to
journalists and asserted that "[d]uring the last twenty years journalism
has become prominent, if not preeminent, as a profession., 37 The
president of the Missouri Press Association proclaimed during a speech
33. See CAREY, supra note 18, at 80-82.
34. See Stephen A. Banning, The Professionalization of Journalism: A Nineteenth-
Century Beginning, 24 JOURNALISM HIST. 161 (1998-99); see also SIDNEY KOBRE,
DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN JOURNALISM 532-36 (1969).
35. See DE FOREST O'DELL, THE HISTORY OF JOURNALISM EDUCATION IN THE UNITED
STATES 19 (1935).
36. See id. at 22.
37. Id. at 29.
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in 1879 that "editing newspapers is as much a profession as practicing
law or medicine. 38
The trend to professionalization grew more prominent during the
first two to three decades of the twentieth century, in part as a response
to what some have characterized as a crisis of public confidence.39
Indeed, journalism was only one of many occupations that sought to
professionalize in the early 1900s, a trend quite compatible with the
growth of progressivism. 0 The now dominant trade magazine, Editor
& Publisher, began publication in 1901, and immediately began
championing professional status for journalists.4 ' Media ethics codes
began to proliferate,42 and university programs in journalism began to
grow. When Joseph Pulitzer endowed the Journalism School at
Columbia University in 1904, the university itself issued a statement
asserting that the new school would rank with existing professional
schools of law, medicine, engineering, architecture, and teaching.43
Educators formed their own first organization in 1912, building
ultimately to the development of an accreditation system for college and
university programs in the mid- 1 940s."
Sigma Delta Chi and Theta Sigma Phi, the forerunners of today's
Society of Professional Journalists, were formed in 1909.' 5 The
American Society of Newspaper Editors organized in 1923 with a
constitution emphasizing professional purpose:
To promote an acquaintance among members, to develop a strong
professional esprit de corps, to maintain the dignity and rights of the
profession, to consider and perhaps establish ethical standards of
professional conduct, to interchange ideas for the advancement of
professional ideals and for the more effective application of profes-
sional labors, and to work collectively for the solution of common
problems.'
38. Banning, supra note 34, at 161.
39. See Douglas Birkhead, The Power in the Image: Professionalism and the
'Communications Revolution', AM. JOURNALISM, Winter 1984, at 1 i.
40. See Margaret A. Blanchard, Press Criticism and National Reform Movements: The
Progressive Era and the New Deal, 5 JOURNALISM HIST. 34 (1978).
41. See Mary Margaret Cronin, Profits, Legitimacy and Public Service: The
Development of Ethics and Standards in New York City's Newspapers, 78 n.4 (1992)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, on file with the Michigan
State University Library).
42. See id. at 271.
43. See O'DELL, supra note 35, at 60-61.
44. See PAUL L. DRESSEL, LIBERAL EDUCATION AND JOURNALISM 34 (1960).
45. See WILLIAM MEHARRY GLENN, THE StGMA DELTA CIE STORY 161 (1949).
46. Casper S. Yost, Professional Organization, in AN INTRODUCTION TO JOURNALISM:
2000]
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So taken with the importance of professionalization was one of the
organization's founders that he declared:
Journalism has taken its place among the great professions. Its
influence is universally recognized. It has become a necessity of
modem life and modem progress. Its development is one of the
wonders of our age. It pervades all civilization and makes a constant
impress upon human thought and achievement everywhere. Yet it is
in fact so new that it is only now beginning to realize within itself that
it is not a mere aggregation of individuals pursuing a common
vocation, but an entity, whose rights must be guarded, whose integrity
must be maintained, and whose responsiblities must be recognized,
by its individual parts.47
Calls for licensing of journalists can be found as early as 1910 to
1920, by journalists as well as by politicians, and with virtually no
recognition that licensing might raise First Amendment issues.4 No less
a luminary than William Allen White was quoted as saying:
Until the people of this country get it well in their heads that journal-
ism is a profession which must be licensed and controlled, as the
medical and legal professions are licensed and controlled, there can
be no freedom of the press which is not liable to great abuses ....
When the newspaper is socially controlled as medicine and law are,
the freedom of our newspaper will be an asset. As it is, our freedom
is a liability.49
Walter Lippmann called for journalism to move toward greater
professionalism and worried that if journalism did not improve itself,
Congress might intervene with greater regulation." Also in the twenties
and early thirties, the first books onjournalism ethics appeared, strongly
championing the ideal of journalism as a public trust, and praising the
development of ethics codes.5
AUTHORITATIVE VIEWS ON THE PROFESSION 49 (Lawrence W. Murphy ed., 1930).
47. CASPER S. YOST, THE PRINCIPLES OF JOURNALISM at v (1924).
48. See NELSON ANTRIM CRAWFORD, THE ETHICS OF JOURNALISM 141-43 (1924).
49. LEON NELSON FLINT, THE CONSCIENCE OF THE NEWSPAPER 401 (1925) (quoting
William Allen White).
50. See WALTER LiPPMANN, LIBERTY AND THE NEWS 76-80 (Transaction Publishers
1995) (1919).
51. See, e.g., CRAWFORD, supra note 48; FLINT, supra note 49; WILLAM FUTHEY
GIBBONS, NEWSPAPER ETHICS: A DISCUSSION OF GOOD PRACTICE FOR JOURNALISTS (1926);
ALBERT F. HENNING, ETHICS AND PRACTICES IN JOURNALISM (1932).
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In other words, by the mid-1920s at latest, the vocabulary of
professionalism had entered journalistic discourse. Clearly, journalism
was beginning the same professionalization process as other occupa-
tions. There was no looking back. In the mid-1940s, the Hutchins
Commission on Freedom of the Press released its controversial report
declaring journalism to have become a sort of public trust and articulat-
ing the idea that the media were obligated to behave in a socially
responsible manner. 2 Although many journalists still did not think of
themselves in the same sense as physicians or attorneys-and many still
may not-the die was cast. The remainder of the twentieth century
would see journalists become better educated-the vast majority in
college and university journalism schools-as well as the development
and revision of more codes of ethics. Although they had initially been
critical of the Hutchins Commission's report, recommendations and
characterizations of the press, journalists came to accept and even tout
the idea that they occupy a position of enormous public trust and
obligation as surrogates for the public and watchdogs for the public
interest.
III. DEVELOPMENTS IN TORT LAW AND NEGLIGENCE
Just as journalism was beginning the professionalization process,
significant change was coming to the law of torts and negligence. In
fact, only in the latter part of the nineteenth century was the law of torts
coming to be regarded as a discrete branch of law.53 And only in the
twentieth century was the law of torts to evolve into primarily a system
for compensating injury rather than a system for discouraging miscon-
duct.' Perhaps even more important.was the evolution of the concept
of legal duty into "the idea of a general duty, owed to all the world by
all the world, but limited to those who were 'at fault'-the negligence
principle."55 In other words, the late nineteenth century saw the law of
torts brought into harmony and conformance with the law of
negligence.' Although late nineteenth century negligence principles
seemed intended as much to limit liability as to expand it, over time
52. See THE COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS. A FREE AND RESPONSIBLE PRESS
(1947).
53. See EDWARD G. WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 3
(1979).
54. See id. at 62.
55. Edward G. White, The Impact of Legal Science on Tort Law. 1880-1910, 78
COLUM. L. REV. 236 (1978).
56. See id.
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negligence law took a path toward a more expansive, contextual
definition of legal duty that was to become ready-made for expanding
the idea of what constitutes malpractice. It opened the door, for
example, to liability in the absence of"privity"-that is, in the absence
of any special, contractual-like, relationship. Indeed, negligence law
may have developed as it did in part to deal with an increased number
of accidents involving strangers. 7
Already by 1900, Jeremiah Smith was able to generalize that
[T]here is no topic of the law in which lack of precedent is entitled to
less weight than in negligence. Negligence is largely a modem
conception, and the scope of the action is constantly widening. Legal
remedy is allowed to-day as to various states of facts where no one
would have dreamed of suing a century ago. 8
Negligence thus became a sufficiently malleable concept to become a
tort in itself as well as to constitute the standard of fault required by
other torts. Its far-reaching "failure to use due care" standard, balancing
of utility and risk, and openness to establishment of new legal duties
open the door to actions for a broad range of harmful or dangerous
behavior. It also invites comparison between defendants' conduct and
standards of appropriate occupational behavior defendants themselves
have articulated. Therefore, it should come as no surprise to see
plaintiffs testing journalists' behavior not only in the context of such
familiar torts as libel, but also in actions based on a broad variety of
other theories, most of which invoke issues of negligence in one way or
another.
IV. JOURNALISM AND THE IDEA OF MALPRACTICE
I have suggested something of the obvious: that the development
of liability for malpractice is the dark side of professionalization,
although not entirely unwelcome by some professionals themselves.
Malpractice liability may even further the professionalization process by
validating and highlighting occupational standards or criticizing their
breach. 9 Should we not expect the same in journalism when it has
manifested the characteristics of a professionalizing occupation? To be
sure, pure self-interest motivates many efforts to restrain the press,
57. See WHITE, supra note 53, at 16.
58. Jeremiah Smith, Liability for Negligent Language, 14 HARV. L. REV. 184, 193
(1900).
59. See LEE G. BOLLINGER, IMAGES OF A FREE PRESS 47 (1991).
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compensate "victims," and regulate the media. But in a larger sense,
many such efforts, the arguments they invoke and the principles to
which they give life may be best understood under the rubric of
professionalization and malpractice.
For example, there is obvious linkage between many of the
principles of American libel law and professional standards.' Journal-
ists and some scholars have explicitly favored judging legal fault in libel
cases by ajouralistic malpractice standard-i.e., according to whether
the conduct leading to the libel represented a departure from generally
recognized standards of appropriate conduct for journalists, including
widely acknowledged standards of ethics.6 Although the Supreme
Court seems to have resisted such a standard overtly, at least where
public figures are concerned,62 such resistance may be more apparent
than real. For even as the Court has wrestled with the question of what
provides circumstantial evidence of actual malice, it has pointed to
factors with a strong basis in contemporary journalistic
norms--obviously biased or shallow sourcing, materially changing the
meaning of a source's remarks, failure to use obviously vital sources,
and so on.63 And when negligence is the fault standard, even if the
standard isn't explicitly journalistic malpractice, evidence as to
departure from journalistic norms can easily enter as a judge and jury
ponder the circumstances under which an alleged error occurred"
Courts have thus both modeled what they believe to be inappropriate
media behavior and invited evidence as to appropriate journalistic
conduct.
It is nearly impossible for journalists to make legal arguments
without invoking the public interest they purport to serve. We see this
clearly in arguments for the privilege to protect confidential sources and
information, in claims for access to people and information, in the
60. See Brian C. Murchison et al., Sullivan's Paradox: The Emergence of Judicial
Standards of Journalism, 73 N.C. L. REV. 113 (1994). But see William P. Marshall &
Susan Gilles, The Supreme Court, the First Amendment, and Bad Journalism, 1994 SUP. CT.
REV. 169.
61. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTs § 580B cmt. g (1977); Lackland Bloom
Jr., Proof of Fault in Media Defamation Litigation, 38 VAND. L. REV. 247 (1985); Todd
Simon, Libel As Malpractice: News Media Ethics and the Standard of Care, 53 FoRDHAM L.
REV. 449, 452-53 (1984).
62. See Harte-Hanks Comm. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 665 (1989) ("[A]
public figure plaintiff must prove more than an extreme departure from professional
standards .... ).
63. See, e.g., Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 501 U.S. 496 (1991); Harte-Hanks,
491 U.S. at 665; St. Amant v. Thompson,390 U.S. 727 (1968).
64. See Bloom, supra note 61, at 344.
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argument for strong protection against libel actions, and in resistance to
actions for even the most unseemly news gathering methods. But
claims that the public interest requires protection for journalists even
when they clearly cause harm serve only to emphasize the public
trusteeship role journalists have embraced. And in the relatively rare
instances when journalists lose in court-and, not infrequently, when
they win-unredeemed failure to serve the public interest may be
prominently on display.65 It is difficult to think of many occupations in
which workers routinely claim that harming someone is nevertheless
essential in the name of broader public service obligations. It is not an
easy position to sell, at least to victims and to the public who are its
supposed beneficiaries.
During the past two decades in particular, journalists have found
themselves targeted with a broad new range of actions--"trash torts,"
as one commentator has described them--seeking recognition of new
legal duties, remedies for new kinds of harm, and application oftheories
of liability not heretofore attempted in a journalistic context. We see
65. See, e.g., Harte-Hanks Comm., Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657 (1989)
(finding actual malice of libel defendant who purposely ignored vital sources that
seriously undermined story); Food Lion Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC Inc., 194 F.3d 505
(4th Cir. 1999) (holding network liable for trespassing where journalists obtained jobs
by falsifying resumes, then secretly shot videotape in workplace); Rice v. Paladin
Enter., 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997) (reversing grant ofsummary judgment in wrongful
death action for contract killer's manual used to commit crime); Sharon v. Time, 599
F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (finding publisher not immune from libel action against
Time by former Israeli defense minister over allegations that he was responsible for
killing of Palestinian refugees); Hyde v. City of Columbia, 637 S.W.2d 251 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1226 (1983) (reversing motion to dismiss in negligent
disclosure action where plaintiff was terrorized by former assailant after newspaper
published her name and address); see also George Ventura, I TrustedA Reporter, BRILL'S
CONTENT, Feb. 2000, 85-91 (reporting that newspaper company paid $10 million
settlement after reporter illegally entered company's voice mail system; confidential
source sued newspaper for breach of confidentiality). But see Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491
U.S. 524 (1989) (finding no liability for newspaper publishing name of sexual assault
victim while assailant was still at large).
66. See Charles C. Scheim, Comment, Trash Tort or Trash T?.: Food Lion, Inc. v.
ABC, Inc., and Tort Liability of the Media for Newsgathering, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 185,
185 (1998). See also Symposium, Undercover Newsgathering Techniques: Issues and
Concerns, 4 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 1005 (1996); Robert E. Drechsel, Media
Malpractice: The Legal Risks of Voluntary Social Responsibility in Mass Communication, 27
DuQ. L. REv. 237 (1989); David A. Logan, Masked Media: Judges. Juries, and the Law of
Surreptitious Newsgathering, 83 IowA L. REv. 161 (1997); Marshall & Gilles, supra note
60.
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actions now for simple negligence,"' trespassing," negligent and
intentional infliction of emotional distress,69 wrongful death,7' breach of
contract, 71 and tortious interference,' in addition to the standard libel
and privacy claims. Many of these, too, might be seen not merely as
efforts to end-run difficult libel and privacy defenses (which they
certainly can be), but as attempts to bring law more closely into accord
with obligationsjournalists have already embraced. Such a development
would seem little different from increasingly successful efforts to hold
other professionals legally responsible for violating occupational
standards and expectations they have established.
V. CONCLUSION
Faced with stagnant or declining readership of newspapers, the
trend toward "infotainment" and fewer resources for broadcast news,
corporatization of media, and poll data consistently showing the public
to be frustrated and angry with them, journalists have become deeply
concerned about their public perception and support. Journalists seem
to believe that with enough polls, focus groups, and self-criticism, they
will be able to diagnose and respond effectively to the crisis of public
confidence they feel afflicts them. They seem to assume that re-
commitment to professional ethics and public service-more profes-
sionalism, in other words-are key to improving the situation. The rise
of the public journalism movement and the formation of Committee of
Concerned Journalists provide two examples."
The assumption may be incorrect. It is conceivable, as Bruce
Sanford argues in his recent book, that the public itself is blameworthy,
shooting itself in the foot by often blaming journalists for doing exactly
67. See Risenhoover v. England, 936 F. Supp. 392 (W.D. Tex. 1996); Cliff v.
Narragansett Television L.P., 688 A.2d 805 (R.I. 1996).
68. See Food Lion Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC Inc., 194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999).
69. See Hustler v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988); Hyde v. City of Columbia, 637
S.W.2d 251 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1226 (1983).
70. See Rice v. Paladin Enter., 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997); Kersis v. ABC Inc.,
103 F.3d 129 (9th Cir. 1997) (unpublished); Cliff v. Narragansett Television L.P., 688
A.2d 805 (R.I. 1996); Hogan v. Hearst Corp., 945 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997).
71. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
72. See Cook v. Winfrey, 141 F.3d 322 (7th Cir. 1998); Metabolife Int'l Inc. v.
Wornick, 72 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (S.D. Cal. 1999); American Broad. Co., Inc. v. Gill, 6
S.W.3d 19 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999).
73. See Committee of Concerned Journalists, Statement of Concern (visited June 29,
2000) <http://www.journalism.org/statement.html>.
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what they ought to be doing. 4 But it is also conceivable that public
frustration stems in part from journalists not fulfilling expectations
journalists themselves have fostered. Herein lies the paradox of
professionalization. Never before have journalists been so well-
educated, had so many sophisticated tools at their disposal, shown quite
so much introspection about their work. From top to bottom, the overall
quality of American journalists may never have been higher-more
professional. Yet, unlike other professionalized occupations which have
themselves had to confront crises in public confidence, asjournalists do
their jobs better, they may only make many of their constituents more
angry.
74. See generally BRUCE W. SANFORD, DON'T SHOOT THE MESSENGER: HOW OUR
GROWING HATRED OF THE MEDIA THREATENS FREE SPEECH FOR ALL OF US (1999).
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